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ver the thirty years since his death Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) has 
emerged as one of the key philosophers of the 20th Century.  Yet he 
claimed to be moved throughout the entirety of his work by a single 
question: the question of the meaning of being.  According to Heidegger the ancient 
Greek thinkers experienced being with a sense of wonder that has been lost in 
modernity.  There has never been a satisfactory answer to this question and 
philosophers are no longer even perplexed by their inability to answer it.  It 
was the question of being (Seinsfrage) that Heidegger set out to confront in his 
unfinished master work Being and Time (1927).  The young Heidegger years 
before the publication of that work had been afforded an insight to an aspect 
of what would become his central concern from what at first might seem an 
unlikely source: the medieval philosopher and theologian John Duns Scotus.  
Scotus inspired Heidegger in so far as his thought was in proximity to “real 
life,” and while he would later move decisively away from the position he took 
in his ‘scotus Book,” in a move that has been referred to as the first “turn” in 
his thought from the ‘system of Catholicism” to liberal Protestantism, Scotus 
provided the young scholar with an insight into human individuality that would 
prove decisive in his mature work.  Despite this move away from any kind of 
“onto-logic,” there is an element of Heidegger’s thought that is influenced by 
Scotus (1265/6-1308), one of the brightest stars of medieval philosophy.  So, 
while my investigation is conducted with the fact of this turn in mind, my aim 
is to explore this element.   
Early in his career Heidegger wrote his post-doctoral teaching 
qualification or Habilitation, Duns Scotus” Theory of the Categories and of Meaning, on 
Scotus under the supervision of the Neo-Kantian philosopher Heinrich 
Rickert.  However, the situation is complicated by the fact that in his 
Habilitation Heidegger based some of his considerations on a text called the 
Grammatica speculativa that was attributed to Scotus.  This text was later shown 
to be a work of Thomas of Erfurt.  Next to nothing is known about Erfurt 
except that he was active early on in the 14th c e n t u r y .   N o w ,  H e i d e g g e r ’ s  
philosophical method in the Habilitation w a s  s u c h  a s  t o  b e  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  
current “problems” in philosophy and his strictly philosophical aim was to 
engage in a dialogue with a past thinker in the service of these current 
problems.  The author of the Grammatica speculativa had worked along lines 
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drawn by Scotus to such an extent that when questions of authorship were 
finally settled it did not discredit the work Heidegger had put forward. 
This approach of looking to texts in the history of philosophy and 
seeking to bring them to bear on contemporary debates points forward to 
Heidegger’s later destructive readings of the history of philosophy in his mature 
works.  In Being and Time Heidegger tells us of the need to “destroy” the 
tradition of philosophy precisely because of its solidification into a body of 
tradition.  In this destruction, which from the perspective of Being and Time and 
The Basic Problems of Philosophy, a lecture course from the late 1920s that deals 
with some of the problems originally intended for discussion in Being and Time, 
is actually a positive approach, he sets himself the task of loosening up the 
concepts and positions put forward by past thinkers in order to get to the 
“fundamental experiences” from which these concepts actually arose.   
In  Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger talks about the “birth 
certificate” of concepts.  He is concerned to see where our concepts came 
from, what inspired them and ultimately, whether they are appropriate to the 
subject matter to which they are applied.  This kind of approach, he tells us in 
his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, will sometimes involve placing oneself in 
what a text does not in fact say (the “unsaid”) in order to force it into speech.  
The project of destruction comes into its own in Being and Time and belongs 
essentially to the project of that text.   
In Being and Time Heidegger sought to approach the question of being 
through a fundamental ontology of Dasein.  Dasein, for want of a better way of 
expressing it, is Heidegger’s term for the human being.  It means being-there and 
connotes being there, here and now.  Dasein is that peculiar “place” where being 
is revealed and as such is fundamentally “in” a world.  The thought here is that 
being is something like meaning and Dasein is that being who is sensitive to 
meaning.  As Richard Polt has put it: “Being is the difference it makes that there is 
something rather than nothing.”1  It is Dasein who is sensitive to this difference.  
Fundamental ontology sought to lay out the structures of Dasein so as to 
prepare the way for tackling the problem of being.  Of all things that are, it is 
only Dasein whose “being is an issue for it”: Dasein has its being “to be” (their 
life to live) in a way that no other thing has.  Before the question of being is 
even explicitly stated, Dasein has an implicit awareness of what it means to be.  
In Heidegger’s terms, Dasein has a pre-theoretical understanding of being that 
is always in play in Dasein’s everyday dealings with it’s environment.  The 
question of being is nothing less than the radicalisation of this pre-
understanding.   
The question of being is made even more problematic by the fact that 
being is in no way a particular being.  Being is not a thing, nor is it a class of 
things.  That is, there is an ontological difference between being  and beings.   
Heidegger sought to tackle being and only in light of this task was he 
concerned with particular beings.  This is precisely why Dasein was so 
                                                 
1 Richard Polt, Heidegger, An Introduction (London: University College London Press, 
1993), 3.  
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important, for it is Dasein who, in addition to understanding particular things, 
also has an understanding of being.   
The problem of being was first raised for Heidegger in an Aristotelian-
scholastic context and this context had a decisive influence over the way he 
formulated the problem in Being and Time.  There, in an important respect, 
Heidegger agrees with the scholastics.  He says: “Being is the transcendens pure and 
simple.”2  Being for the scholastics was called a “transcendental” in the sense 
that it transcended the ten categories outlined by Aristotle in his text of the same 
name.  Heidegger agrees with this, being is neither a being nor a class of beings.  
In  Being and Time Heidegger also wants to invoke the Kantian sense of 
transcendental where transcendental means “necessary condition” or 
“condition of possibility” of objectively valid experience.  A transcendental 
condition in Kant’s sense is a necessary condition which logically precedes and 
provides for the possibility of something else.  For example, a necessary 
condition of any experience at all for a human being is that that experience will 
be in space and time.  According to Kant, human beings cannot experience the 
world in any other way.   
Heidegger wants to say a little of both with his notion of being.  Being 
does exceed the categories (the scholastic dimension) but it also forms a 
transcendental structure that provides for the appearance or presence of beings 
(the Kantian dimension).  Hence the ontological difference between being and 
beings.  Heidegger’s genius lay, in large part, in his creative use of notions from 
the tradition of philosophy.  Heidegger differs from both Kant and the 
scholastics.  He differs from Kant (and much of the tradition) in the sense that 
there is no recourse to an “unintended” reality.  Kant famously distinguishes 
between the phenomenal world and the noumenal world.  The phenomenal world 
is the world of human experience.  The noumenal world is that of things as 
they are “in themselves” independent of human experience.  Of this noumenal 
world, we can know only that it exists.  There is nothing corresponding to the 
noumenal in Heidegger.  As he says: ““Behind” the phenomena of 
phenomenology there is essentially nothing else .  .  ..”3  He differs from the 
scholastics in the sense that he has no intention of providing a theology.   
Heidegger’s interest in the scholastics was primarily philosophical and 
philosophy, so Heidegger thought at this point, must be atheistic.   
Nonetheless, Heidegger clearly saw what was important in both Kant and the 
scholastics, and what he could use. 
Heidegger, in Being and Time at least, saw many of the problems that 
permeate the tradition as arising out of the philosophy of Aristotle.  Aristotle 
understood the question of being to really be about substance (ousia).  In his 
Categories Aristotle distinguishes between primary substances, such as this 
particular man and secondary substances, such as the species “man” and the genus 
“animal.”  He says:  
                                                 
2 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by J.  Macquarrie and E.  Robinson 
(Cambridge: Blackwell, 1962), 62. 
3 Ibid., 60.  
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A substance – that which is called a substance most strictly, 
primarily, and most of all – is that which is neither said of 
a subject nor in a subject, e.g.  the individual man or the 
individual horse.  The species in which the things 
primarily called substances are, are called secondary 
substances, as also are the genera of these species.  For 
example, the individual man belongs in a species, man, 
and animal is a genus of the species; so these – both man 
and animal – are called secondary substances.4  
 
That which exists in a primary way is any particular thing.  However, in 
order to talk about this particular thing you have to invoke its species and 
genus.  “What is this particular thing? It is a “man”.”  “What is a “man”? It is 
an animal.”  Aristotle also enumerated the ten categories.  They can be 
understood as examples of ways we might characterize a particular thing we 
meet in our experience of the world.  For example, we might speak about its 
‘substance,” its “quantity,” its “qualities,” its “relations,” its “place,” its “time,” 
its “position,” its ‘state,” its “activity” or its “passivity.”  Once the particular 
thing’s substance has been identified—for example, it is a “man”—the other 
nine categories can be invoked to give further information about it.   
Now, there are at least two problems with this schema that are of 
particular importance for us.  Firstly, when we want to talk about a particular 
man, say Socrates, we find ourselves saying that Socrates is a “man.”  This may 
be true, but it doesn”t tell us anything about ‘socrates” beyond the fact that he 
shares certain properties with every man.  Socrates is a thing of a particular type.  
W e  m i g h t  h e r e  w a n t  t o  i n v o k e ,  i n  A r i s t o t l e ’ s  d e f e n c e ,  s o m e  o f  t h e  o t h e r  
categories.  If we want to know more about Socrates why not simply talk about 
his “quantity” or “activity” and so on.  The difficulty with this is precisely the 
fact that these categories, while they may be useful for talking about objects 
such as stones, do not get to the heart of the kind of being appropriate to 
Socrates.  Socrates is not just one more “thing” amongst others.  Recall, 
Heidegger’s characterisation of human being as Dasein.  Precisely as Dasein, 
Socrates is not a just a thing of a particular type, a type of “what.”  As 
Heidegger would say, Dasein is always a “who,” never a “what.”  If Heidegger 
is right, Socrates is not a “thing” at all because he “has” his being “to be” and 
can relate to it in a way that nothing else can.  In short, Aristotle’s ten 
categories are not appropriate to Dasein and talking in those terms misses the 
point of what it is to be a Dasein.  Heidegger needed to forge a new vocabulary 
that would be more appropriate to human being.    
Secondly, when Aristotle takes the question of being to be about 
substance he fails to note the crucial difference between being and beings, the 
ontological difference that is so important for Heidegger.  Being is in no way a 
                                                 
4 Aristotle, Categories and De Interpretatione, trans. by J.L.  Ackrill (New York: Clarendon 
Press, 1963), 5-6.  
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being or thing.  For Aristotle, by contrast, substances are beings or things: they 
are primary substances (the individual man) or secondary substances (species 
or genus).  Aristotle stands at the very beginning of the tradition Heidegger 
sought to destroy in Being and Time.  He is the father of what Heidegger calls at 
that time the “forgetfulness of being.” 
Our two objections are bound up with one another.  In Heidegger’s 
view, Aristotle failed to recognize the ontological difference and—partly as a 
consequence of this—he failed to recognize the unique nature of Dasein, the 
being who has an understanding of being.  The result of the Aristotelian 
ontology was an ontology of things that are simply there, or present-to-hand.  
Aristotelian substance ontology ushered in the “metaphysics of presence” that 
Heidegger sought to move beyond.  Heidegger realized that the Aristotelian 
categories do not apply to all there is.  Not everything is simply “present.”  In 
particular, they don”t apply to Dasein: Dasein is not simply a present “thing.”  
Quite the contrary, Dasein is in fact distinguished by its very lack in being.  
Dasein is not complete in the way rocks are complete.  Dasein has no fixed 
essence, no particular “what” that it essentially is.  Dasein is a project, it has its 
being “to be” and is always a “who.”   
This realization was decisive.  An entire new vocabulary and method 
was needed for characterizing Dasein.  Particularly, Heidegger recognized that 
Dasein is always “in” a world that it is concerned with and that for the most part 
Dasein is “fallen” into this world and tends to understand itself in terms of that 
world.  In this state Dasein is inauthentic and is best described as generic.  
Inauthentic Dasein simply “goes about its business as one does” and does not 
face up to the problem of deciding how to live its life.  However, in 
fundamental moods such as anxiety Dasein is forced to face up to it’s situation 
and can become authentic.  In this state Dasein is explicitly concerned about and 
attends to its situation.  Such a Dasein has faced up to the question of how it is 
to live its life.  The problem is that anxiety is rare and disturbing and being 
authentic is difficult.  It is far easier to just get on with things as one does.   
Dasein is always situated in a particular context and has the task of 
living its life.  Of all beings, Dasein is the one in a “factical situation.”   
“Facticity” is a structural dimension of Dasein and is bound up with Dasein’s 
individuality.  The fundamental ontology of Being and Time sought to render 
Dasein transparent in its being.  Integral to this task was an account of Dasein 
in its “facticity,” its concrete life.  What was required was a “hermeneutics 
(interpretation) of facticity” and since our concepts arise out of the “factical 
life” of Dasein this project was deeply connected with the task of the 
destruction of the tradition.    
In order for this project to gain its point of departure however, an 
insight into the individuality of the individual was required.  A major advance 
in this direction from the point of view of his philosophical development came 
with Heidegger’s early engagement with Duns Scotus.  It was precisely here 
that Heidegger came across an explicit challenge to the Aristotelian schema, a 
challenge that included a specific concern for the uniqueness of the individual.   
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It was this concern for the individual in Scotus’s metaphysics that made him so 
attractive to the young Heidegger.  He says:  
 
His striking individuality as a thinker characterizes him in 
general as having unmistakably modern traits.  He has a 
more extensive and accurate nearness (Haecceitas) to real 
life, to its manifoldness and possible tensions than the 
scholastics before him . . . he knows how to turn . . . from 
the fullness of life to the abstract world of mathematics.5  
 
Scotus saw clearly the need to augment the Aristotelian categories and 
something of their failure when it came to capturing all that there is to capture 
about the individual. 
We have said that almost nothing is known about the life of Thomas 
of Erfurt.  We are in only a slightly better situation when it comes to Duns 
Scotus, Doctor subtilis himself.  We know that he was born between 
December 1265 and March 1266 in the town of Duns in the Scottish Borders.  
That he was ordained on the 17th of March 1291 at St Andrew’s Priory in 
Northampton.  That he was a Franciscan.  That he taught at Cambridge, 
Oxford and Paris.  That he was expelled from France in June 1303 because of 
his allegiance to Pope Boniface VIII (1294-1303) in the dispute with King 
Philip IV The Fair (1285-1314) of France.  We also know that he died at 
Cologne on the 8th of November 1308.   
In philosophy, Scotus’s genius shows itself in the subtlety and force of 
his metaphysics.  Here, we can clearly see why he was known subsequently by 
the Honorific title ‘subtle doctor.”  For Scotus, the subject matter of 
metaphysics is being, and God is its goal.  Scotus held that there were a certain 
number of “facts” that could be known about God independent of revelation.  
The science whose charge it is to prove such facts is metaphysics.  Since 
particular sciences, such as metaphysics, do not prove the existence of their 
own subject matter and the metaphysician proves certain facts about God—
most notably, His existence—God cannot be the subject matter of 
metaphysics.  The proper subject matter of metaphysics is being and being, as 
we have said, is a transcendental.  For Scotus, being comprises “all that is 
intelligible” and he takes it that the human mind, when considered as an 
intellectual power, is capable of knowing all that is intelligible.  As such, being 
is the “first object of the intellect,” its most natural concern.  It is precisely here 
that we can note our first explicit connection with Heidegger: for Heidegger, 
no less than for Scotus, being was—to use the language of the scholastics—the 
first object of the intellect.  And while Heidegger came to see the limits of 
Aristotelian-scholastic thought, especially with regards to the problematic of a 
phenomenology of religion and an investigation of the religious lifeworld of 
“Primal Christianity,” this scholastic insight is taken over by Heidegger with 
                                                 
5 Martin Heidegger, Duns Scotus” Theory of the Categories and of Meaning, trans. by H.  
Robbins (Chicago: De Paul University, Chicago, June 1978), 15.  
 
 
152     HEIDEGGER AND DUNS SCOTUS 
the claim that the “understanding of being” is Dasein’s most fundamental 
characteristic.        
Metaphysics is, for Scotus, the science of the transcendentals and the 
way towards this science had been pointed to by Aristotle himself when, in his 
Metaphysics, he notes that attributes such as “being” and “unity” fall outside the 
scope of his categories.  The transcendentals are precisely those attributes of a 
thing that transcend Aristotle’s ten categories and being is the most fundamental 
of these.  Scotus also held that when considered without determination, being 
is our most abstract concept.  For Scotus, there is a basic sense in which things 
such as substances and accidents, God and creatures, all exist.  Considered in 
this basic way, being is simply opposed to nothingness.  The other 
transcendentals, unity, truth and goodness/desirability, are coextensive with being 
and are in some sense properties of it.  Of any particular being, say Socrates, in 
addition to saying that it exists (being), we can say that it is one (unity), that it 
truly is what it is (truth) and that its being what it is, is desirable (good).  If the 
transcendentals are correctly elucidated, so held Scotus, then the existence of 
God can be inferred.  As such, God is the goal of metaphysics and not its 
subject.   
Where did Heidegger see Scotus’s “nearness to real life”? This 
dimension arose out of Scotus’s metaphysics and was one of his most noted 
innovations.  It is with his notion of haecceitas or “thisness” that Scotus brought 
scholastic thought into proximity with the real life of the individual.6  This 
notion is bound up with another central notion in his metaphysics: the formal 
distinction.   
In medieval scholasticism it was common to distinguish between two 
forms of distinction: the real distinction (two things are really distinct and can in 
principle be separated: God could destroy one while preserving the other) and 
the distinction of reason (two things are conceptually distinct but not objectively or 
really distinct).  By contrast Scotus’s formal distinction holds that it is possible 
to distinguish between different formalities of one and the same thing.  For 
example, it is possible to distinguish between God’s intellect and His will 
within the one Divine being; intellect and will are really identical.  This 
distinction is more than a mere conceptual distinction because it has a basis in 
the “reality of God” and it is less than a real distinction because these 
formalities cannot be really separated.  Distinct formalities are just as essential 
to the nature of the thing: they are really identical and only formally distinct.   
Scotus’s proximity to real life came when he applied his account of the 
formal distinction to the problem of individuation.  Recall that in our above 
account of Aristotle’s Categories a problem emerged with regards to the 
“individuality of the individual.”  If both Socrates and Plato are members of a 
particular species, then what distinguishes them? It is precisely with regards to 
this problem that Scotus’s notion of haecceitas really comes into its own.  The 
                                                 
6 The concept of haecceitas tends to be discussed in terms of the problem of 
individuation in Scotus’s translated texts.  See his Philosophical Writings, A Selection, trans. by  A.  
Wolter (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1987) and Duns Scotus, Metaphysician, trans. by W. Frank and A.  
Wolter (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1995).    
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individual members of a particular species have something in common by 
virtue of which they are members of that species.  Both Socrates and Plato 
share something that makes them both “men.”  Yet, Socrates and Plato are 
also different: Socrates is not Plato after all.  Thomas Aquinas, following 
Aristotle, had held that it was “matter” which individuated members in a 
particular species.  Socrates and Plato are different because they are made of 
different stuff.  Both, however, remain essentially men.  Scotus, by contrast, 
held that what in fact individuated different members of a species was precisely 
their respective haecceitas.  As such, any created thing, such as Socrates, has two 
really identical but formally distinct “essential aspects”: namely, its kind (man) 
and its individuating “haecceity.”  Crucially, any particular thing’s haecceity is 
unique to it: there can be many men, but only one Socrates and this by virtue 
of his “thisness.” 
While it is certainly the case that Scotus was dealing with traditional 
metaphysical problems, such as that of individuation and the Problem of 
Universals, that Heidegger in his mature writings was concerned with only in a 
very specific sense, it was the crucially important notion of haecceitas that gave 
Heidegger the insight he required into the individuality of the individual and it 
was here that Scotus entered into the proximity to real life, the “place” that 
Heidegger noted in his Habilitation (quoted above) as so desperately important.  
With Heidegger, haecceitas became facticity.  Scotus’s insight allowed Heidegger 
to “go all out after the factic” and turn the concrete life of Dasein into a 
problem.  As far as Heidegger is concerned, all questioning, including ontology, 
has its origin in the concrete life of the individual Dasein.  Dasein, in its 
concrete life, has an understanding of being and the question of the meaning of 
being is nothing less than the radicalisation of this understanding.  Heidegger, 
in Being and Time, retains, in his own peculiar way, the insights of Duns Scotus. 
Heidegger was deeply influenced by Scotus, and despite the fact that 
he did move away from his very early ‘scholastic” manner of approach, this 
influence can be felt in Being and Time.  Although Being and Time remained 
unfinished it has proven to be one of the classics of twentieth century 
philosophy and it is testimony to the enduring genius and relevance of Duns 
Scotus that the author of this classic of Western philosophy learned something 
of what it means to be a philosopher from this seemingly remote scholastic 
thinker. 
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